Civil war was a catalyst in forming the jurisprudential views of Thomas Hobbes and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. In this paper I claim that Holmes's pragmatism advances a fundamentally distinct view of order from Hobbes, a dynamic rather than analytical and static conception, which can be seen by comparing their response to perennial conflict, which both made central in all its forms: military, political, moral, and intellectual. The difference is that Hobbes resolved the problem of conflict through authority, * Forthcoming, Contemporary Pragmatism.
while Holmes does so through inquiry and the adjustment of practices. I propose three dimensions in which to elucidate this: historical, ontological, and practical. By historical I mean Holmes's replacement of the Hobbesian analytical model of law, designed to address (and presumably suppress) conflict by state control, with an endogenous model that assimilates conflict in a process of formal but communal inquiry into discrete types of dispute. By ontological I mean Holmes's rejection of the analytical boundary around law, dating to Hobbes and still reflected in the contemporary separation of law and morals, in favor of a holistic fallibilism, which like Dewey's encompasses all inquiry--legal, scientific, ethical, aesthetic, philosophical--under one ontological roof. The third or practical dimension refers to Holmes's critique of ideology, best known from the words of his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York: "The fourteenth amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"; or, more to the point, "general propositions do not decide concrete cases." oOOo If pragmatism (as Richard Rorty and others have claimed) has no grand scheme beyond the commitment to deliberative democratic pluralism, does it have some stronger account, as Wilfrid Sellars puts it in defining philosophy, of "how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term"? In this paper I will pursue the vision of a distinctly dynamic and transitional concept of order implicit in classical pragmatism, rather than an analytical vision grounded in a fixed cognitive image. Central to this theme is the very different response to human conflict of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., from that of Thomas Hobbes.
On November 11, 1862, Captain Holmes wrote from his regiment in Virginia to his sister Amelia despairing that the Confederacy could be overcome by force. He had been wounded twice, in October of 1861 while his regiment was being thrown by a superior force off Balls Bluff into the Potomac River, and again in September 1862 by a bullet through the neck at Antietam. He would soon be hit again at Fredericksburg, his regiment all but decimated. After witnessing the dead piled 5 deep at the Bloody Angle at the Battle of the Wilderness, he would decline promotion and resign his commission in August of 1864 to return to Cambridge to study law.
Holmes's despair proved unjustified and the Union did somehow hang together--how barely he was acutely aware. Philosophical pragmatism--in its classical form--followed the American Civil War. This was only 80 years after the American Revolution, and 60 years after the War of 1812. Emerging in the wake of three fratricidal wars, it is to be expected that within the origins of pragmatism would be some response, if not a distinctive one, to the problem of human conflict.
The flip side of conflict is order; and the problems of moral and intellectual order if not inseparable are resistant to separation if we take Sellars seriously. Hume's task in his moral philosophy, notes Haakonssen, is completely analogous to his task in epistemology: to explain how a common world is created out of private and subjective elements (1981, 4) .
Holmes, in many ways a successor to Hume, has not been fully recognized as an original philosopher by legal academics, but a comprehensive reading, in context with his pragmatist contemporaries, adds a distinctive dimension to the making of the moral, and certainly legal, character of that common world. What makes a real community hang together, in the broadest sense of the term?
To address this question we may pick up a line of thought developed by Holmes and continue it in Dewey's extended wake. Dewey's lifelong project, as Ralph Sleeper has characterized it, was to elucidate a radical pragmatic naturalism as a critique of, and an alternative to, the dominant analytical tradition in logic, epistemology, and ontology (Sleeper 1986 Lotze's version of analytical logic that seized Dewey's in 1903 (Sleeper 1986, 5, 64-5) . Accepting for the moment the pervasiveness of conflict, is there a more plausible paradigm than Hobbes's mythical contract for explaining its relationship to law? Exemplifying a historicist naturalism, Holmes's model is taken directly from the law books. His is the recorded one of constant disputes, channeled into law courts and thence organized into legal intelligence. For Holmes, litigation, seen all around us, is a key part of the process of social ordering; and I will suggest that he found within it features that are representative of more general relations between dispute and inquiry, between conflict and theory.
I suggested that the model was original, but it had important
precedents. An earlier version of common law based theory was developed Hale begins his Reflections with an elaborate demonstration that reason is by no means univocal as applied to different subjects of inquiry, such as mathematics, physics and politics, and that it must be permitted to assume a special meaning in the difficult field of law. This is because "the texture of human affairs is not unlike the texture of a diseased body laboring under maladies, it may be of so various natures that such Phisique as may be
proper for the cure of one of the maladies may be destructive in relation to the other, and the cure of one disease may be the death of the patient." (1921, 503) Though unread by Holmes until much later, it prefigures his own common law based habit of thinking from particular situations, closer to raw experience, while resisting easy general answers. By reasserting an endogenous model against Austin's analytical scheme, Holmes was obliged to flesh it out and respond to Austin's more insistent ontological separation of law from morals. Here he would draw on the naturalist, empiricist attitudes of the Scottish Enlightenment that influenced his own education and that of his Harvard-graduated peers like Wright, Peirce, and James.
As noted above, Hale's view was an early challenge to the rationalist approach that Bentham and his disciple John Austin would later elaborate. Here the legal decision is described as coming before the reasoning; the analytical matrix of the law, and its a priori rules of decision, would appear surprisingly irrelevant. This surely appears unsound, until we recognize that
Holmes is speaking not of the ordinary case, but of the tough case, the novel situation, often representing a new and at first intractable clash of interests.
The simplified sketch implies--perhaps too much so--that there is no clear rational itinerary from the written law to the specific decision. More importantly, though, it implies a common-law judicial minimalism, deciding It is only after a series of determinations on the same subject-matter, that it becomes necessary to "reconcile the cases," as it is called, that is, by a true induction to state the principle which has until then been obscurely felt. And this statement is often modified more than once by new decisions before the abstracted general rule takes its final shape.
A well settled legal doctrine embodies the work of many minds, and has been tested in form as well as substance by trained critics whose practical interest it is to resist it at every step (1870). Holmes's fallibilism resists the idea of a natural conceptual boundary around law. It sees no difficult case as occupying a place inside or outside a legal boundary. Rather, the hard case presents a degree of novelty or uncertainty. Cases come into the legal process from the chaos of life's complexity. They bring innumerable distinct kinds of uncertainty and difficulty. It is a categorical error to treat all types of legal uncertainty as univocal, of one conceptual kind, an error that seems inevitably to follow from the notion of a boundary, or at any rate from the debate over the ontological separation of law and morals. It is an error that, as Holmes would later complain, may be used to rationalize a judge's predetermining the outcome of an ongoing controversy by circumventing detail and appealing directly to a "moral principle."
From this perspective, two fallacies have followed from the analytical conception, going back at least to John Austin, that law has a distinct conceptual boundary. One is that a particular case, embodying a specific question, can arise outside the boundary, and hence be legally indeterminate. According to the positivist model, law, considered as an adjudicative matrix, either succeeds or fails on its own. When deciding difficult cases this means the positivist must accept the problematic possibility of a radical "legal indeterminacy."
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The other fallacy, following from the debate over whether law and morals are separate, is that morals, or moral principles, must be included within the boundary when necessary to resolve the legally indeterminate case. This gives rise to the superficial notion that constitutional rights, as privileged "moral principles," can be available as trumps over statute and precedent whenever their sweepingly general language permits.
If a case represents a prevalent controversy on which a judge has strong feelings, and there is a relevant constitutional value such as free expression, annoying facts that may align the case with prior contrary decisions can be I use this phrase in its radical sense, not the moderate meaning sometimes
given by legal realists. See, e.g., Kellogg (2009) .
